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Killing the Messenger: An Experimen-
tal Analysis of the Hostile Media Effect 
Jeanette Moreho use Mendez 
Oklahoma State University 
According to the Pew Research Center, 65% of the 
American public perceives that the news media are bi-
ased (2004). This paper looks at the hostile media effect-
the theory that individuals assume media bias against 
them (Vallone, Ross and leper I 985). The results from an 
experiment with 325 undergraduates have several impli-
cations regarding the role of political information. First, 
the hostile media effect is not consistently supported-
that is, perceptions of bias result from actual content, 
with individuals responding to media messages with the 
assumption of bias, but not of bias linked to partisan-
ship. When the expectations of the hostile media effect 
are supported, the results show a larger effect for Repub-
licans, not Democrats (Beck et al. 2002: Mutz and Martin 
2001). Second, respondents tend to rate the reporter as 
fair when content is balanced and unfair when content is 
disparate or one-sided; when they do perceive a bias, 
partisan Democrats tend to kill the messenger and de-
scribe the reporter as unfair while partisan Republicans 
tend to describe the reporter as fair. The present d_ata 
indicate influences beyond partisanship and offer alter-
native explanations for perceptions of bias. 
In an age of growing cynicism about government and politics, it is not surprising that roughly 65% of all respondents to a PEW Research Center (2004) survey perceive a political bias 
in news coverage. Researchers are currently studying the proc-
esses by which individuals interpret media content and bias (e.g., 
Eveland and Shah 2003; Lee 2005). Findings suggest that inter-
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personal factors, such as a person's discussion network, ideology, 
and pa1tisanship, affect perceptions of bias . Given the strength of 
association between partisanship and its effect on individual de-
cision-making, partisanship might best explain the discrepancy 
between perceived bias and actual bias. 
The hostile media effect explains the gap between actual 
media content and perceptions of bias in content. Its basic prem-
ise is that partisans interpret media content as opposed to their 
views when in fact it is balanced among viewpoints (Vallone, 
Ross and Lepper 1985). However, the theory (and recent re-
search) fails to consider bias perceptions when media content is 
not balanced. For example, Dalton, Beck and Huckfeldt (1998) 
found that the news media present multiple, conflicting, and dis-
parate messages regardless of whether or not content is biased. 
Dalton et al. ( 1998) refer to bias as that which is imposed inten-
tionally by the journalist, which is different than others who de-
fine bias in terms of shear positive and negative tone of the 
article ( e.g. Stempel and Windhauser I 991 ). The multiple defini-
tions of bias available have led to conflicting measures and re-
sults. 
Given the current climate concerning media bias, both in 
terms of the public perceiving bias, and journalists arguing its 
very existence, an examination of the effects of content on 
evaluations of bias is extremely timely. Further, since partisan-
ship is a widely used heuristic in decision making, what happens 
when one relies on partisanship as a heuristic to evaluate media 
content? ls it true, as the hostile media effect suggests that parti-
sanship will cloud one's judgment? Using the hostile media ef-
fect as a framework, one might predict that disparate, or one-
sided, messages would be easiest to project a bias onto because 
the content itself presents opposing viewpoints. If so, the poten-
tial for perceived media bias may be greater than previously 
thought. Therefore, an examination of both balanced and dispa-
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rate messages is important to fully understand the extent to 
which perceptions of bias are actual or projected. 
INFORMATION PROCESSING BIAS: 
THE HOSTILE MEDIA EFFECT 
Vallone et al. ( 1985) confirmed the existence of the hostile 
media effect in the form of attitude influenced processing and 
different standards. According to attitude-influenced processing, 
partisans make evaluative judgments about media content based 
on their predisposed beliefs rather than actual content (Chaiken, 
Liberman and Eagly 1989; Tversky and Kahneman 1982). A per-
ceptual bias can occur when partisans who are predisposed to 
skepticism and searching for disagreeable content report unequal 
amounts of negative content toward their preferred positions 
(Gunther, Christen, Liebhart and Chia 200 I). According to the 
different standards approach, partisans view balanced coverage 
as being biased based on their belief that their superior viewpoint 
should receive more favorable coverage than other viewpoints 
(Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken 1993). Depending on the situational 
context, either process can be used to explain why an objectively 
balanced newscast can be interpreted as biased by partisans. 
There is also support for the hostile media effect in terms of 
political party affiliation. Dalton et al. ( 1998) examined percep-
tions of newspaper content during the 1992 presidential election 
and found that strong Republican supporters tended to describe 
newspapers as biased in favor of Bill Clinton and strong Democ-
ratic supporters described the same newspapers as favoring 
George H. W. Bush. However, the conclusions of Dalton et al. 
( 1998) were based on a single variable for party identification 
and the results were interpreted as an effect of both ends (De-
mocrats and Republicans) of the variable. According to Beck, 
Dalton, Greene and Huckfeldt (2002) and Mutz and Martin 
(200 I), the results instead might support the basic premise that 
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Democrats generally hold favorable opinions of the press (ac-
counting for the lower percentage of respondents who stated that 
the press favored Bush) and Republicans are generally critical of 
the media (explaining the larger percentage of respondents re-
porting a pro-Clinton bias). Therefore it is Republicans, and not 
Democrats, who are more susceptible to the hostile media effect. 
The previous research has provided mixed support for the 
hostile media effect in terms of partisanship. Further, the major-
ity of the experimental evidence has been based on balanced 
content, meaning partisans are exposed to content where neither 
group is given more positive or negative coverage than the other 
group. For example, if two candidates are running for office and 
both support campaign finance reform, the balanced article de-
scribes these similar viewpoints while giving equal coverage to 
each candidate in terms of tone and content (both candidates are 
presented as moral). However, balanced content is not the only 
type of content that can exist. Therefore, this study examines the 
hostile media effect under a different situation- that of disparate 
media content, which actually is more likely to occur in a real 
world situation. 
Disparate content refers to coverage that is one-sided- more 
or less positive for one group compared to coverage for the other 
group. Again, while some scholars have defined this as biased, 
this study avoids that evaluation and simply refers to this content 
as disparate. For example, if two candidates are running for of-
fice and each has a different viewpoint in terms of campaign fi-
nance reform, an article with disparate coverage would use the 
differing opinions to give more favorable coverage to one candi-
date (the candidate is described moral) over the other candidate 
(the candidate is described as corrupt). Such an article could give 
positive coverage to the candidate who supports campaign fi-
nance reform, while giving more negative treatment to the can-
didate who opposes reform. 
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EXPECTATIONS OF THE HOSTILE MEDIA EFFECT 
To test the effects of partisanship on perceptions of bias un-
der balanced and disparate media content, this study uses the 
theory of the hostile media effect to generate hypotheses for both 
situations. First, in terms of balanced coverage, previous evi-
dence shows that respondents report balanced coverage as bi-
ased. In particular when groups were given the same balanced 
content to watch, partisans evaluated the balanced content as 
biased. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
HJ: Partisans will evaluate all balanced content as biased against 
their preferred side . 
Balanced coverage is not the only type of content that can 
appear in the media; however, within the examination of the hos-
tile media effect, the presence of disparate coverage has not been 
examined. Although previously unexamined, the theory of the 
hostile media effect can be used to generate expectations for 
situations of disparate messages. The hostile media effect states 
that partisans will always assume a bias for the other side, unless 
the partisan's preferred side receives more positive coverage, 
which actually can happen in disparate coverage. ln disparate 
coverage, the partisan will report no bias exists because his or 
her side is favored and this is the only acceptable condition for a 
partisan. Remember, the only acceptable (and thus considered 
unbiased) situation is when the partisan group receives more fa-
vorable coverage, anything else is considered by the partisan as 
biased. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
HZ: Partisans will evaluate disparate coverage favoring their side as 
unbiased because they find the imbalance in favor of their side 
as the only acceptable situation; and 
H3: Partisans will evaluate disparate coverage favoring the opposi-
tion as biased because the content is seen as unacceptable . 
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In addition to these expectations based on balanced and dis-
parate content, I expect the hostile media effect to be more likely 
when content is disparate compared to when content is balanced. 
Disparate content presents two conflicting points of view, which 
makes it easier for respondents to recognize an imbalance and 
perceive a bias. Given that people are limited information proc-
essors, situations that make the end result (perception of bias) 
easier to achieve are desirable. Balanced content will still result 
in perception of bias, but to arrive at this, partisans will have to 
make more of an effort to justify the perception. Therefore I hy-
pothesize that: 
H4: The hostile media effect to be more likely under situations of 
disparate content compared to situations of balanced content. 
The above expectations center around perceptions of media 
content, where the hostile media effect can be tested in terms of 
the extent to which respondents perceived media content as bi-
ased. The hostile media effect can also be assessed by how a par-
tisan evaluates journalistic balance and fairness . For example, 
A rad and Carnevale ( 1994) reported that partisans gave higher 
ratings to mediators who ruled in favor of their argument than to 
neutral mediators or mediators who ruled in favor of the oppos-
ing side. Similarly, the evaluation of the journalist will be based 
on the respondent's perception of the article content, as well as 
partisanship. Democrats and Republicans will assume journalists 
do not favor their preferred side. The hostile media effect as-
sumes partisans will not recognize bias for their preferred side 
because they would find any favorable imbalance and acceptable 
and report this as unbiased; however partisans should report bias 
for the opposition in all other situations and, since this is consid-
ered unacceptable, I hypothesize that partisans will penalize the 
journalist in these situations. Accordingly, applying the hostile 
media effect to journalistic evaluations raises the following hy-
potheses: 
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HS: Partisans will describe all journalists that do not treat their side 
most favorably as unfair 
H6: Partisans who perceive a bias for the opposition will evaluate 
the journalist as unfair 
H7: Partisans who perceive a bias in favor of the opposition will 
evaluate the journalist as unfair. 
BEYOND INFORMATION PROCESSING BIASES: 
ACTUAL MEDIA BIASES 
Having used the hostile media effect to generate expecta-
tions, it is important to note that other explanations might pre-
vail. Namely, the current political and media climate in society 
could influence evaluations. While there is ample discussion in 
the mainstream as to if bias exists, there is a debate among po-
litical scientists regarding this. Though not an exhaustive list, 
researchers who have documented a liberal media bias include 
Efron ( 197 I), Keely ( 1971 ), and Bozell and Baker ( 1990). Re-
searchers who have documented a conservative media bias in-
clude Liebling ( 1964), Cooper and Soley ( 1990), and Lee and 
Solomon (1991). The list of researchers who claim that media 
content is, on average, devoid of bias includes Hostetter (1976), 
D' Alessio and Allen (2000), and Niven (2003). Finally, it must 
be noted that the definition of "bias" remains contentious in cur-
rent research and, therefore, disparities in the definition and 
measurement of bias are likely leading to conflicting results. 
The focus of mainstream debate on this issue concerns the 
"existence" of a liberal bias, with a growing number of conserva-
tive commentators lamenting a bias that few liberals vehemently 
refute. The current literature contains little information on the 
extent to which this one-sided discourse preconditions individu-
als to assuming the existence of a liberal bias in the media re-
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gardless of actual content. Given conflicting evidence on the ex-
istence of bias, it is reasonable to speculate that perceptions of 
bias are linked to the current discourse on the topic. Thus, the 
hostile media effect might not best explain current partisan per-
ceptions. 
EXAMINING THE HOSTILE MEDIA EFFECT 
This analysis looks at the effects of bias perceptions in media 
coverage by using newspaper content of two candidates who 
show positive support for the same issue or different viewpoints 
that result in disparate coverage. For each scenario content for 
both sides is included, in order to evaluate perceptions of bias of 
one side compared to another side. This comparison could not be 
made if content focused only on one side. The four coverage op-
tions are: 
( I) lhe Democrat supports side A and U1e Republican supports side B. 
(2) the Democrat supports side Band the Republican supports side A. 
(3) both candidates suppo1t side A. or 
( 4) both candidates support side B. 
The articles are objective in nature because both the bal-
anced content and disparate content is presented as factual and 
devoid of any intent to prefer one side over the other ( e.g. Dalton 
et al. 1998). Unbiased content was purposefully used in all four 
scenarios, yet the research assumption dictated that readers 
would project a bias onto the story source depending on the issue 
and how each side was presented. For instance, if side A was 
presented as moral and correct and side B as corTupt and unjust, 
the hostile media effect states that supporters of both candidates 
would report biases for all content scenarios except when their 
favored candidate supported side A and the other supported side 
B. In those situations, it was assumed that the partisan would 
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describe the positive coverage of their candidate (moral versus 
corrupt) as fair and balanced. 
A controlled survey experiment was designed to examine 
information processing and the hostile media effect given certain 
expectations and content scenarios. The Fal I 200 I experiment 
was conducted with 325 undergraduate students who voluntarily 
participated for extra credit for two introductory political science 
courses at a large Midwestern university. The use of students is 
sometimes challenged in experimental research. However, given 
the reported lack of partisan attachment in younger individuals, 
the results obtained from this analysis might be weaker than the 
results that would be drawn from a sample consisting of older 
non-students. 
Data were collected via a computerized survey containing 6 
knowledge questions, 2 party identification questions, a fabri-
cated newspaper article, 5 questions designed to measure the 
extent to which accurate or biased information processing oc-
curred, 14 candidate trait evaluation questions, and 10 questions 
designed to assess the favorability of the candidates. Follow-up 
questions were included to measure evaluation intensity. 
The survey software randomly assigned newspaper articles 
to each participant: Students were told that each article was 
taken from a newspaper covering two congressional candidates, 
one Democrat and one Republican. They were also told that each 
candidate had a particular stance (side A or side 8) on campaign 
finance reform as it concerns political action committees. Article 
content varied according to the four scenarios described above. 
The disparate articles presented one candidate supporting side A 
and the other side B; the neutral articles presented both candi-
dates as supporting side A or B. 
• Appendix A presents each of the four newspaper anicles . 
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Side A and B content were identical for all articles . The tone 
of information for Side A was positive, with the candidate de-
scribed as a moral citizen who supported campaign finance re-
form, who rejected donations from political action committees, 
and who refused to be "bought" by corporate interests. The tone 
of information for side B was negative, with the candidate de-
scribed as someone who was beholden to corporate interests, 
who had amassed a large war chest, and who opposed campaign 
finance reform. 
The scenarios can be justified for three reasons . First, the 
experiment occurred in fall 200 I, following the terrorist attacks , 
when many believed bipartisanship characterized the political 
mood. Also, at this time, the McCain-Feingold Act , a bipartisan 
campaign reform act , was rapidly gaining in popularity. Second, 
the articles were clearly written in language intended to convey 
positive and negative cues . For example , the phrase , "taking 
back power from special interests ' ' would have a negative conno-
tation for those opposed to reform. Lastly, and most importantly, 
a separate sample of 119 undergraduate students received sec-
tions of the articles to read, with the candidate names and party 
identifications omitted . For each , they identified the content as 
positive or negative. The results show that 87% of the respon-
dents identified content where the candidate supports campaign 
finance reform as positive and 97% reported content where the 
candidate opposes campaign finance reform as negative. There-
fore, while some might argue classifying all pro-reform content 
as positive conflates the positive /negative information with issue 
positions for campaign finance reform, these results show stu-
dents do identify pro-reform content as positive content and anti-
reform content as negative, irrespective of issue positions. 
For these three reasons, information is considered positive 
when the candidate supports reform and negative when the can-
didate opposes it. This creates two neutral content situations , in 
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which each candidate has the same viewpoint, and two disparate 
content situations, with one favoring the Democratic candidate 
(the Democratic candidate receives positive coverage and the 
Republican candidate receives negative coverage), and one fa-
voring the Republican candidate (the Republican candidate re-
ceives positive coverage and the Democratic candidate receives 
negative coverage). 
Two dependent variables were used to measure perceptions 
of bias and the hostile media effect. Similar to Vallone et al. 
( 1985), bias was assessed by asking respondents, "Which candi-
date do you think the newspaper favored in the article you read, 
or did it not favor either candidate?" Responses were coded as 0 
for a perceived Democratic bias, I for no perceived bias, and 2 
for a perceived Republican bias. This question serves as an as-
sessment of bias because previous research has defined bias as a 
situation in which a candidate is favored in terms of content (e.g. 
Stempel and Windhauser I 991 ). The hostile media effect was 
also evaluated in terms of the perceived fairness of the reporter, 
using the question "How fair-minded would you rate the journal-
ist who wrote this article?" Responses were given along a Likert-
type scale in which I was coded as "very unfair" and 7 "very 
fair." 
The primary independent variables in this analysis were the 
message content of the newspaper article and partisanship. Mes-
sage content was measured using dummy variables if the re-
spondent read one of the four articles-I if an article was read, 0 
if not. Three dummy variables were used with the four articles, 
with the balanced and negative content category excluded. 
Partisanship was measured via answers to the National Elec-
tion Studies questions that were included in the survey. Re-
sponses were given along a seven point Likert-type scale, with I 
being "strong Democrat" and 7 "strong Republican." Party iden-
tification was considered important to testing the hostile media 
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effect, since it was assumed that partisans would perceive biases 
in media content based on their political preferences. Further, a 
method was needed to confirm a minimum degree of equal dis-
tribution of the four articles in terms of party identification in 
order to control analytical bias. The party identification distribu-
tion data indicate that partisanship was even across the sample 
and across treatment groups. Additionally, interactive effects of 
message content and partisanship were used as independent vari-
ables to analyze the extent to which the participants responded to 
a particular stimulus (type and tone of content). It is reasonable 
to expect partisans to respond differently to different stimuli and 
this can not be understood without an interactive effect. 
RES UL TS AND DISCUSSION 
The first set of hypotheses address how message content af-
fects the way that partisans perceive media content. Using the 
hostile media effect, hypotheses were generated for perceptions 
of bias when content is balanced and when it is disparate. Parti-
sans will perceive a bias against their preferred position unless 
the article content was clearly more favorable toward their side, 
in which case they would report zero bias. Therefore, balanced 
content should result in perceptions of bias, while disparate con-
tent will result in perceptions of bias when content is negative 
for the preferred candidate and perceptions of no bias when con-
tent is positive for the preferred candidate. Also, while percep-
tions of bias should occur in both situations, balanced and 
disparate content, I posit perceptions of bias will be more likely 
when content is disparate rather than when content is balanced, 
because the disparity will be easy to recognize and project a bias 
onto. To test for this, an ordered logit analysis was conducted 
with perception of bias as the dependent variable. Perception of 
bias is coded as O for a perceived Democratic bias, I for no per-
ceived bias, and 2 for a perceived Republican bias. The inde-
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pendent variables included in the analysis are partisanship and 
dummy variables for which article the respondent read. Results 
from this analysis are shown in Table I. 
Table 1 
Logit Regression Results: Effects of Partisanship and 
Media Content on Perceptions of Media Bias 
Variables 
Party identification 
Positive content for Democrat 
Positive content for Republican 
Positive content for both candidates 
Positive content for Democrat*party identification 
Positive content for Republiean•party identification 
Threshold I 
Threshold 2 
LR Chi2 
N 
Significance i p<0.10, t p<0.001 
Coefficient 
-0.03 
-2.02t 
0.94i 
-1.04 i 
0. 17 
0.01 
-0.99 
0.94 
66.55+ 
323 
(SE) 
(0 .09) 
(0.62) 
(0.57) 
(0.56) 
(0.14) 
(0.13) 
(0.38) 
(0.38) 
Results indicate that content and party identification affect per-
ceptions of bias. The magnitude of this relationship is best ex-
plained through predicted probabilities of perceptions of bias for 
strong partisans, since the hostile media effect should be greatest 
for them (Table la).• The study will first examine the effects 
when content is balanced, then when content is disparate and 
lastly the study will draw comparisons between these scenarios. 
• Probabilities were also generated for weak partisans and the results show consistency 
across the panisanship scale as expected by the hostile media effect. Strong panisans 
show larger probabilities, on average 0.05 compared to weak partisans . Therefore , given 
that the hostile media effect aims to explain the behavior of strong panisans , I report 
those in the text. When weak and strong panisans are collapsed into one group , the prob-
abilities are on average 0.025 lower than found for strong panisans . Additional probabili-
ties can be provided by the author upon request. 
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TABLE la 
Predicted Probabilities of Assessment of Bias for 
Strong Partisans Based on Newspaper Article Content 
Newseaeer Article Content 
Disparate Content Balanced Content 
Assessment + Democrat - Democrat + Democrat - Democrat 
of bias - Reeublican + Reeublican + Reeublican - Reeublican 
Strong Democrats 
Democratic 0.71 0.12 0.51 0.28 
bias (0.54, 0.87) (0.05. 0.21) (0.35, 0.68} (0. 16, 0.402 
No bias 0.23 0.38 0.37 0.45 (0. I 1, 0.36} (0.27. 0.48) (0.26. 0.4 7) (0.39, 0.51) 
Republican 0.06 0.50 0.12 0.27 
bias (0.01, 0.102 (0.32, 0.67} (0.04, 0.20} (0.15, 0.39} 
N 16 10 13 16 
Strong Reeublicans 
Democratic 0.51 0.14 0.51 0.32 
bias (0.31, 0.71} (0.05, 0.23) (0.35, 0.68} (0.16, 0.48} 
No bias 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.44 (0.31, 0.71) (0.29, 0.49} (0.26, 0.47) {0. I 6. 0.48) 
Republican 0.12 0.47 0.12 0.24 
bias (0.03, 0.212 (0.29, 0.65) (0.04. 0.202 {0.10, 0.37} 
N II 17 17 II 
Note: Figures represent predicted probabilities obtained from Table I esti-
mates . Confidence intervals are in parentheses. Newspaper article content: + 
= positive coverage, - = negative coverage . Assessment of bias refers lo 
which candidate, if any, was perceived as favored. Figures in bold font are 
expectations based on the hostile media effect. 
Balanced Content 
In terms of balanced content , remember that partisans are 
expected to report bias in favor of the opposition , both when the 
balance is positive for both candidates and when the content is 
negative toward both candidates. This is because partisans are to 
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assume all content is biased unless the content is more favorable 
for their preferred side. As the probabilities show, this is not nec-
essarily true. Strong Democrats have a 0.12 probability of report-
ing a Republican bias when content is balanced and positive, and 
a 0.27 probability of reporting a Republican bias when content is 
balanced and negative. Clearly this does not support the hostile 
media effect. On the other hand, strong Republicans are more 
likely to conform to the hostile media effect, though the results 
are not overwhelming. trong Republicans have a 0.51 probabil-
ity of reporting a Democratic bias when content is balanced and 
positive, and a 0.32 probability of reporting a Democratic bias 
when content is balanced and negative. These probabilities do 
not indicate widespread support of the hostile media effect, but 
they do show strong Republicans are more likely to conform to 
the hostile media effect compared to strong Democrats. This re-
sult is in line with recent evidence of the hostile media effect in a 
real world setting where party identification is examined (Mutz 
and Martin 200 I; Beck et al. 2002). 
Overall, in terms of balanced content, only moderate support 
is found for the hostile media effect, and this applies to strong 
Republicans, but not strong Democrats. Instead, the results sug-
gest partisans assess positive and negative information differ-
ently, rather than assessing all balanced content, regardless of 
tone, as biased. When article content is balanced and positive, 
both strot1g Democrats and strong Republicans have a 0.51 prob-
ability of reporting a Democratic bias. This shows a hostile me-
dia effect for strong Republicans, but not for strong Democrats. 
When content is balanced and negative, both strong Democ-
rats and strong Republicans are more likely to report no bias (0. 
44 and 0.45, respectively). A possible explanation for this finding 
is the presence of a projection effect according to current dis-
course in which partisans assume a liberal media bias when con-
tent is favorable to both candidates. Thus, when a message is 
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ferred candidate. It is hard to argue that the negative Republican 
content stood out in contrast to the positive Democratic content, 
and led to a perception of a Democratic bias by strong Democ-
rats. Rather, strong Democrats respond to the positive informa-
tion about the Democratic candidate and report a Democratic 
bias. The same is true for strong Republicans- positive Republi-
can content leads to a perception of a Republican bias. 
Overall, the evidence in terms of disparate content is mixed. 
When the disparity favors the preferred candidate, partisans rec-
ognize the actual content and report a bias for the preferred can-
didate. When the disparity favors the opposition, the hostile 
media effect is more likely. Interestingly, partisans equate dispar-
ity with bias, though this study refrains from calling these arti-
cles biased because there are objective reasons why disparity can 
exist. 
Comparisons between Neutral and Disparate Content 
The hostile media effect will be more likely when content is 
disparate as opposed to balanced because the disparity allows 
respondents to easily notice that one side is favored over the 
other. Therefore, rather than projecting a bias that does not exist, 
partisans assume disparity is bias. Remember, this study does not 
evaluate disparity as bias because there could be objective rea-
sons for the disparity, such as how the campaigns are run (e.g. 
Dalton et al. 1998). Comparing the probabilities between bal-
anced and disparate situations does show that partisans conform 
to the expectations of the hostile media effect more so when con-
tent is disparate, as predicted; however, support for the expecta-
tions is quite modest. When content is disparate and negative for 
the preferred candidate, the hostile media effect prevailed for 
both strong Democrats and strong Republicans (0.50 and 0.51 ), 
but not in the other disparate condition (0.23 and 0.39). How-
ever, when the articles were balanced, the only evidence of a 
THE JOURNAi. OF POLITTCAl. SCIENCE 
KILLI NG THE MESSENGER 45 
balanced but negative, pa1tisans recognize the negative tone and 
fail to report either candidate as favored, regardless of their gen-
eral perception of a mainstream media bias. This study cannot 
offer a conclusion on this point because the respondents were not 
asked to express their opinions regarding bias in the mainstream 
media. Further research is required to test whether a factor other 
than information processing biases (e.g., a hostile media effect or 
motivated reasoning) can be used to explain perceptions of bias. 
Overall, when content is balanced, Republicans are more likely 
than Democrats to perceive a bias and conform to the hostile 
media effect, though the probabilities are not overwhelmingly 
large in support of this. Further , partisans assess information dif-
ferently, depending on tone. 
Disparate Content 
In situations of disparate coverage , partisans are expected to 
report no bias if their side is favored (since they consider this the 
only acceptable situation) and biased if their side receives any-
thing less than this . First, in terms of disparate coverage that is 
negative for the preferred candidate , both strong Democrats and 
strong Republicans report this as biased for the opposition (0.50 
and 0.51, respectively) . This does show there is a hostile media 
effect for partisans in th is cond ition . On the other hand, when 
content is disparate and negative for the opposition , neither 
strong Democrats nor strong Republicans have large probabili-
ties of conforming to the hostile media effect and reporting no 
bias (0.23 and 0.39 , respectively). Interestingly , in both of these 
situations, strong Democrats and strong Republicans evaluate the 
negative opposition content , and positive preferred candidate 
content, as just that. Thus, Democrats report the content as bi-
ased for Democrats (0.71) and Republicans report the content 
biased for Republicans (0.47). Most likely one type of message 
is resonating with respondents- the positive content for the pre-
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hostile media effect is for strong Republicans, when the article is 
balanced and positive. Rather, both sets of partisans are at ti"mes 
able to equally recognize actual content, yet in some situations a 
Democratic bias is assumed for both sets of partisans even when 
not true. This finding suggests that current discourse concerning 
a " liberal media" might actually have an effect on perceptions of 
media bias. Both Democrats and Republicans report the Democ-
rat as favored when content is favorable for the Democrat, even 
in the balanced situation. 
Overall, the expectation that the hostile media effect is more 
likely when content is disparate is supported , though not in both 
cases of disparity . Instead , the tone of the content and the recipi-
ent of the content seem to influence the results more so than the 
hostile media effect. 
Reporter Evaluation 
As a further test of bias perception , respondents evaluated 
the fairness of the reporter. The hostile media effect suggests 
that: (a) unless their side is given most favorable coverage , parti-
sans will perceive all coverage as unfair; and (b) when partisans 
of one party or the other perceive a bias , they will describe the 
reporter as unfair if the bias supports the other candidate . Given 
the results of the previous section , there is evidence that parti-
sans do report bias for their preferred side , which the hostile me-
dia effect does not predict. In these situations, one would expect 
perception of bias for the preferred side to be acceptable for par-
tisans , since they prefer positive content for their candidate, and 
one would expect partisans in this situation to report the journal-
ist as fair. 
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To assess these expectations, this study used an ordered logit 
regression with reporter evaluation as the dependent variable. 
Responses were given along a Likert-type scale in which I was 
coded as "very unfair" and 7 ''very fair." The independent vari-
ables included those listed in Table I. Two dummy variables 
were added-one each for perception of a Democratic or Repub-
lican bias. In each case, responses stating a perceived bias were 
coded as I and responses indicating no perceived bias were 
coded as 0. These variables address the effects of perception of 
bias , which was found in the previous section, and hypothesized 
to effect evaluations of the reporter. Further, this study employs 
interaction terms from the multiplicative product of party identi-
fication and each dummy variable for perception of bias. The 
interaction terms were included because perception of bias is 
contingent on partisanship. Democrats who perceive a Democ-
ratic bias should evaluate reporters differently than Republicans 
who perceive a Democratic bias. The results of the ordered logit 
analysis are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Logit Regressio n Results: Evaluations of Reporter Fairness based on 
Partisa nship and Media Content 
Variab les 
Party Iden ti ti cation 
Positive content for Democrat 
Positive content for Republican 
Positive content for both candidates 
Perceived bias for Democrat 
Perceived bias for Republican 
Perceived Democratic bias*party identification 
Perceived Republican bias*party identification 
Threshold I 
Threshold 2 
LR Chi2 
N 
Coefficie nt 
-0.06 
-0 .80t 
-0.16 
0.19 
-192t 
-2.30t 
0.18 
0.221 
-2.02 
-1.3 1 
52.47+ 
323 
(SE) 
(0.67) 
(2.24) 
(0.47) 
(0.56) 
(3.44) 
(3.74) 
( 1.47) 
( 1.67) 
(0.44) 
(0.43) 
Note: Z-scores for coefficients and standard errors for cut-points in parenthe-
ses., t p<0.05. l p<0.10, t p<0.001 Reporter fairness: -I = somewhat unfair. 
unfair, very unfair; 0 = neither fair nor unfair; + I = somewhat fair, fair. very 
fair. 
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The results indicate that reporter evaluations are affected by con-
tent, perceptions of bias and party identification and the interac-
tion of party identification and perception of bias; however , 
mixed support for the hostile media effect is found. Overall , par-
tisans do have some tendency to kill the messenger. 
Table 2a presents probabilities of journalist ratings based on 
partisanship and newspaper article content. 
TABLE 2a 
Predicted Probabilities of Rating the Journalist asUnfair and Fair for 
StrongPartisans Based on Newspaper Article Content 
Newseaeer Article Content 
Disparate Content Balanced Content 
Journalist + Democrat - Democrat + Democrat - Democrat 
Rating - Re[!ublican + Reeublican + Reeublican - Reeublican 
Strong Democrats 
Fair 0.42 0.57 0.65 0.61 (0.23, 0.59) (0.40, 0.73) (0.50 , 0.802 (0.44, 0.77) 
Unfair 0.42 0.27 0.21 0.24 (0.23, 0.602 (0.14, 0.412 (0.10, 0.32) (0.11, 0.37) 
N 16 10 13 16 
Strong Republicans 
Fair 0.33 0.48 0.57 0.52 
~0.17, 0.48) (0.30, 0.66) (0.40. 0.73) (0.33 . 0. 71) 
Unfair o.so 0.35 0.27 0.31 (0.33. 0.68) (0.19, 0.51) (0.14, 0.41) (0.15. 0.47) 
N II 17 17 II 
Note: Figures repre sent predicted probabilitie s obtained from Table 2 esti-
mate s. Confidence intervals in parentheses . Newspaper article content: + = 
positive coverage, - = negative coverage. Unfair reporter rating: respondent 
described reporter as very unfair , unfair or somewhat unfair. Fair rating: 
respondent described reporter as very fair, fair, or somewhat fair. Entries in 
bold font based on expectations of the hostile media effect. 
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Table 2b presents probabilities of journalist ratings based on 
partisanship and perceptions of bias. 
Table 2b 
Predicted Probabilities of Partisans Rating Reporter as 
Unfair or Fair Based on Perception of Newspaper Bias 
Perceived Article Bias 
Democrat Republican 
Strong Democrat 
Fair 0.34 0.27 
(0.20, 0.48) (0. 12, 0.42) 
Unfair 0.49 0.57 
(0.34, 0.64) (0.39, 0.76) 
N 24 8 
Strong Republican 
Fair 0.51 0.49 
(0.36, 0.66) (0.31, 0.67) 
Unfair 0.32 0.34 
(0.19, 0.45) (0. 17. 0.50) 
N 24 15 
Note: Figures represent predicted probabilities obtained from 
Table 2 estimates . Confidence intervals are in parentheses . 
" Unfair" rating means respondent described reporter as very 
unfair , unfair , or somewhat unfair . "Fair" rating means re-
spondent described reporter as very fair, fair. or somewhat 
fair. Entries in bold type were based on expectations of the 
hostile media effect. 
Balanced Content 
In terms of balanced coverage, where partisans should report 
the journalist as unfair, because the situation is not acceptable, 
both Democrats and Republicans report the journalist as fair, 
both when content is balanced and positive (0.65 and 0.57 re-
spectively) and balanced and negative (0.6 I and 0.52 respec-
tively) . Partisans are more likely to evaluate balanced content as 
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fair, not unfair, contrary to the hostile media effect. This result 
could be anticipated for non-partisans, because balance should 
imply neutrality and given journalistic standards, this should be 
perceived as fair. Surprisingly, however, partisans also respond 
to the overall balanced message and accept the balance and 
evaluate journalists as fair. 
Disparate Content 
As anticipated, when content is disparate, there is more sup-
port for the hostile media effect. The expectation is that partisans 
will evaluate the journalist as fair when the disparity favors the 
preferred side and unfair when the disparity favors the opposi-
tion. First, when content is disparate and negative for the pre-
ferred candidate, Republicans do report the journalist as unfair 
(0.50), while Democrats do so, but with a much lower probabil-
ity (0.27). For Democrats, the current discourse could affect their 
evaluations. In the mainstream debate about a "liberal" media, 
people are told this is unfair and Democrats should not receive 
favorable coverage. Perhaps in response to this, when Democrats 
do receive negative coverage, Democrats find this acceptable. 
This runs counter to the hostile media effect, and even to intui-
tion, but it is one possibility that could later be explored. 
When content is disparate and negative for the opposition 
candidate, both Democrats and Republicans report this as fair, as 
expected, though the probabilities do not exceed 0.50 (0.42 and 
0.48 respectively). This suggests modest support for the hostile 
media effect. However, even with these modest results, the hos-
tile media effect receives more support when content is disparate 
than when content is balanced. Further, strong Republicans are 
more likely than strong Democrats to conform to the hostile me-
dia effect. 
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Perceptions of Bias 
This study initially anticipated that perceptions of bias would 
affect reporter evaluations because partisans should evaluate a 
reporter as fair if they perceive a bias in their preferred direction. 
Otherwise, partisans will evaluate the journalist as unfair. When 
perception of bias is taken into account, however, there is mixed 
support for the hostile media effect (Table 2b). The results show 
that Democrats who perceive a Republican bias do report the 
journalist as unfair (0 .57 probability) and Republicans who per-
ceive a Republican bias report the journalist as fair (0.49). How-
ever, when a Democratic bias is perceived, Democrats do not in 
large part report the journalist as fair (0.34 probability) and Re-
publicans do not in large part report the journalist as unfair (0 .32 
probability) . Interestingly, Democrats are more likely to give an 
unfavorable reporter evaluation regardless of the direction of 
perceived bias, and partisan Republican s are more likely to give 
a favorable evaluation regardless of the direction of perceived 
bias. Could public discourse explain this? Perhaps. Democrats 
might respond to outcries of media bias by evaluating any bias as 
unfair , while Republicans might be resigned to accept what they 
feel is a " liberal ' media . This is an interesting finding overall , 
even if it does not conform to expectations. Partisans are proc-
essing information differently and this is evident in terms of the 
effects of perceptions of bias. 
CONCLUSION 
The results have several implications regarding the role of 
political information. First , in many instances they do not sup-
port the hostile media effect - that is, perceptions of bias result 
from actual content , with respondents reacting to the presence of 
disparate content regardless of the lack of measurable bias. 
When the expectations of the hostile media effect are supported , 
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the results show a larger effect for Republicans, not Democrats, 
which recent evidence also supports (Beck et al. 2002; Mutz and 
Martin 2001 ). Second, respondents tend to rate the reporter as 
fair when content is balanced and unfair when content is dispa-
rate; when they do perceive a bias, partisan Democrats tend to 
kill the messenger and describe the reporter as unfair while parti-
san Republicans tend to describe the reporter as fair. 
The results provide important information as to the ways that 
individuals respond to media content and project biases, espe-
cially in the context of disparate versus balanced information. 
Whereas previous studies have suggested that partisanship af-
fects perceptions of bias, the present data indicate influences be-
yond partisanship. One possible reason is the current national 
discourse on liberal bias in the media. Eveland and Shah (2003) 
found perceptions of bias to be linked not only to partisanship, 
but to conversations with like-minded people. The influence of 
communication networks is unexamined here, but could support 
the idea that a larger discourse, either in one's network, or in the 
mainstream, could be shaping perceptions of bias. 
Furthermore, discrepancies in the literature regarding the 
extent to which bias exists may be definitional , a context that 
apparently affects the general public as well. For example, Dal-
ton et al. ( 1998) and Kahn and Kenney (2002) argue that in cam-
paigns, it is common for one side to receive more favorable 
coverage due to how the campaign is being run. They suggest 
this is not bias per se, but objective reporting. These results show 
that definitional problems not only affect researchers, but the 
public as well. 
The finding of a perception of bias when content is disparate 
regardless of the objectivity of the actual message is particularly 
important in light of the "horserace" type of coverage given to 
most electoral campaigns and the ongoing national concern with 
objective political reporting. Determining the implications of this 
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finding when coverage is perceived to be biased requires further 
examination of the affects of bias perceptions on outcomes (e.g., 
candidate support and voting decisions). In the present study, the 
results reveal a perception of bias in disparate messages that also 
affect perceptions of journalistic fairness. The question remains 
as to whether media consumers are less likely to use such infor-
mation in forming their candidate evaluations. 
The results also suggest that respondents are able to decipher 
actual media messages, even if the messages favor one side, and 
are able to evaluate them accordingly. If this is true, media bias 
might not have any effect on evaluations by the public. Accurate 
recognition shows that people can assess the leanings of the 
press, and if so, media bias might not be capable of shaping 
opinions. Voters might actually be shrewd consumers of the news 
and ignore what they might feel is biased, according to selective 
perception and exposure, which is beyond the scope of this pro-
ject. Respondents were randomly assigned via computer one ar-
ticle to read and were not able to choose among different articles 
and sources, as we would find in the real world. Given the abun-
dance of media outlets to choose from, the public can be selec-
tive in tuning in to certain sources that tit their predispositions. 
Overall, the results provide evidence that individuals per-
ceive media bias, including when political coverage is disparate. 
However, the hostile media effect cannot be used to fully exp lain 
these results. The results suggest that individuals respond to me-
dia messages with the assumption of bias, but not of bias linked 
to partisanship. Instead, the data seem to indicate a tendency for 
media consumers to project bias onto a source when the message 
is disparate. I refrained from calling these articles biased because 
there are objective reasons why a disparity can exist. However, 
partisans did assume disparity equated to bias. The public and 
the media may have different definitions of what constitutes me-
dia bias in a discourse that predisposes individuals to assume 
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bias . Accordingly, researchers need to consider the effects of 
public discourse on information processing and try to understand 
the extent to which partisanship affects the calculations. Re-
searchers also need to consider definitions of media bias, exam-
ine if the public uses different definitions, and determine what 
affect the differences may have on political decision-making. 
The present results suggest factors other than partisanship ex-
plain how 65 percent of the American public report perceptions 
of a media bias, even when actual content is neutral. 
APPENDIX A 
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES AND TONE 
t. Disparate Content: Positive Content for the Democratic candidate, 
negative content for the Republican candidate. 
Denver, CO. May, 15, 2001. In his bid for the U.S. Senate, Democratic 
Candidate Andrew Pierce refuses political action committee money to promote 
an image of independence from special interests. "I'm not bankrolled by the 
special interests," Pierce told a crowd in kicking off his fall campaign against 
Republican William Jackson . "I haven't accepted a dime of PAC money in this 
race . And I'd like to rally you to join me in taking power back from the special 
interests who call the shots ." 
Pierce used to take money from PACs-more than $ 2.5 million from 
1987 to 1995. according to FEC records . But several years ago he decided to 
stop taking PAC money, and he has made bashing special-interest dollars a 
central theme of his current campaign . Pierce was one of about a dozen House 
Democrats to buck their leadership to force a vote on a campaign finance re-
form bill in 1998. "He has been the real deal in fighting for refom1." said Don-
ald J. Simon, general counsel of Common Cause , a liberal watchdog group 
headquartered in Washington, D.C. •'H's as genuine as they come on Capitol 
Hill.'' 
Republican Candidate William Jackson also claims to not having ties to 
special interests . However, an examination of Jackson's campaign donations 
over the years shows how difficult it can be to completely disengage from what 
he calls "the potentially corrupting system." Jackson has raised more than $13 
million during his political career. mostly the traditional way : by dialing for 
dollars, mixing with well-heeled donors, and accepting contributions from 
members of special-interest groups . I !is largest sources of political donations 
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are banks and financial services fim1s, which have had a keen interest in him as 
a member of the House Banking and Finance Committee. According to a Times 
analysis or Federal Election Commission records, lawyers and lobbyists are 
also among his most frequent contributors. as arc doctors and computer-
industry executives. 
Jackson's donor list is not surprising. given that he represents a large 
swath of Silicon Valley. A lawyer for investment bankers helped him draft 
legislation that would benefit large financial concems in the valley. and two 
physicians who donated to his previous campaigns convinced him to introduce 
a bill giving doctors more power in negotiations with HMOs. 
2. Dispa.-ate Content: Positive Content for the Republican candidate, nega-
tive content for the Democratic candidate. 
See above story and substitute the Republican candidate for all or the previ-
ously positive statements for the Democratic candidate, and substitute the De-
mocratic candidate for all of the previously negative comments toward the 
Republican candidate. 
3. Balanced Content: Positive Content for both the Democratic and Re-
publican candidates. 
Denver, CO. May, 15, 2001. In his bid for the U.S. Senate. Democratic 
candidate Andrew Pierce refuses political action committee money in order to 
promote an image of independence. "I'm not bankrolled by special interests," 
he told a crowd when kicking o!T his fall can1paign against William Jackson. "I 
haven't accepted a dime of PAC money in this race. And I'd like to rally you to 
join me in taking power back from the special interests who call the shots." 
Republican candidate Jackson also claims to not being tied to special in-
terests. An examination of Jackson's campaign donations over the years shows 
that it has not been difficult for him to disengage from what he calls "the poten-
tially corrupting system." He has raised more than $ I 3 million during his po-
litical career, mostly in the traditional ways of dialing for dollars and mixing 
with well-heeled donors, without accepting contributions from members of 
special interest groups. 
Both candidates have previously accepted PAC money, but in recent years 
they have made clean breaks from the influence of special interests. According 
to FEC records, Pierce accepted more than $ 2.5 million from PACs between 
1987 and 1995. However, he decided to stop taking PAC money several years 
ago, and has made special-interest dollar bashing a central theme in his cam-
paign. Pierce was one of about a dozen House Democrats to buck their own 
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kadership to lorcc a vote on a campaign finance reform bill in 1998. "lie has 
been the real deal in lighting for refom1," said Donalu J. Simon. general coun-
sd of Common Cause, a liberal watchdog group hcadquanered in Washington. 
D.C. "lle 's as genuine as they come on Capitol Hill." 
Republican Jackson has also sponsored legislation to reform campaign 
finance rules and to maintain distance between Congress and special interests. 
I !is stateu goal is to eliminate the amount of PAC money contributed and ac-
cepted at election time and lo make it easier for candidates to raise money 
without being influenced by special interests. 
4. Balanced Content: Negative Content for both Democratic and Republi-
can candidates. 
Denver, CO. May, IS, 2001. In his bid for the U.S. Senate, Republican 
candidate William Jackson reli.tses political action committee money in order to 
promote an image or independence. "I'm not bankrolled by special interests." 
he told a crowd when kicking off his fall campaign against Democratic candi-
uate Andrew Pierce. 
Pierce also claims to not being tied to special interests. "I haven't accepted 
a <lime of PAC money in this race. And I'd like to rally you to join me in taking 
power back from the special interests who call the shots." 
1 lowever, an examination of both candidates' campaign donations over the 
)Cars shows how difficult it can be to completely disengage from what Pierce 
calls "the potentially corrupting system." Pierce has raised more than $ 13 mil-
l ion <luring his political career. mostly the traditional way: by dialing for dol-
lars, mixing with well-heeled dc,nors, and accepting contributions from 
members of special interest groups. His largest sources of political donations 
are banks and tinaneial linns that have a keen interest in him as a member of 
the House Banking and Finance Committee. According to a Times analysis of 
Federal Election Commission records, lawyers and lobbyists are among his 
most frequent contributors, as are doctors and computer-industry executives. 
Similarly, FEC records show that Jackson has previously accepted large 
amounts or money from PACs-more than $ 2.5 million between 1987 and 
1995. The individuals on Jackson's donor list should not be surprising, given 
that his district covers a large swath of Silicon Valley. For example. a lawyer 
for investment bankers helped him drafl legislation that would benefit Silicon 
Valley financial titans. and two physicians who had donated to his campaign 
convinced him to introduce a bill giving doctors more power in negotiations 
with IIMOs. 
According to their individual records, both candidates are quick to deny 
being bought by special interests. but in the past they have been quick to accept 
money from PACs when offered. 
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